Legal and Ethical Implications of U.S. and Canadian Vaccine Contracts: The Impact of Vaccine Nationalism on the Global Pandemic Response by Tahiri, Ryan S.
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 
Volume 53 Number 1 Article 8 
12-13-2021 
Legal and Ethical Implications of U.S. and Canadian Vaccine 
Contracts: The Impact of Vaccine Nationalism on the Global 
Pandemic Response 
Ryan S. Tahiri 
University of Miami School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr 
 Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Marketing Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ryan S. Tahiri, Legal and Ethical Implications of U.S. and Canadian Vaccine Contracts: The Impact of 
Vaccine Nationalism on the Global Pandemic Response, 53 U. MIA Inter-Am. L. Rev. 231 () 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol53/iss1/8 
This Student Note/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami 
School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-American Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, 
please contact library@law.miami.edu. 
 
 231 
Legal and Ethical Implications of U.S. 
and Canadian Vaccine Contracts: The 
Impact of Vaccine Nationalism on the 
Global Pandemic Response 
Ryan S. Tahiri* 
This note explores the COVID-19 vaccine contracts between 
the U.S. and Canada and the impact of these types of agree-
ments on the global pandemic response. These “pre-pur-
chases,” many of which were executed before the develop-
ment of a vaccine, have afforded a select few nations the op-
portunity to stockpile vaccines, while other nations with 
fewer resources are unable to secure any doses. An effective 
method to counter the effects of the pandemic is the creation 
of a global vaccine network that provides equitable access 
to vaccine doses for nations in need. COVAX was launched 
to ensure that lower and middle-income nations have the op-
portunity to purchase vaccine doses at reduced costs for 
their respective populations. This initiative offers a realistic 
solution to shortening the timeline of the COVID-19 pan-
demic and bringing the global population closer to herd im-
munity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 9, 2020, when the World Health Organization 
(WHO) announced the arrival of the novel coronavirus (“COVID–
19”) in Wuhan, China, few could have predicted the trajectory of the 
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pandemic.1 As COVID–19’s case count grew exponentially and the 
global death toll began to spike, the WHO declared the COVID–19 
pandemic a public health emergency.2 Shortly after, the United 
States government followed suit and declared the COVID–19 pan-
demic a public health emergency.3 In March 2020, President Trump 
declared the COVID–19 pandemic a national emergency, which 
triggered the release of billions of dollars to be funneled towards 
fighting the virus and researching a cure.4 Countries across the 
world have struggled to contain and respond to the health and eco-
nomic effects of the COVID–19 pandemic, as it is the first health 
crisis of this magnitude in over a century, the last of which dates 
back to the arrival of the Spanish flu in 1918.5  
As part of its pandemic response, the U.S. began funding large 
pharmaceutical companies in an effort to develop a COVID–19 vac-
cine.6 These companies, including Pfizer, Moderna, Johnson & 
Johnson, and Novavax, are all based in the U.S. and have received 
upwards of $9 billion for research and development.7 The U.S. gov-
ernment has provided billions of dollars in funding to U.S. pharma-
ceutical companies as part of “Operation Warp Speed,”8 an opera-
tion dedicated to successfully developing, manufacturing, and dis-
tributing 300 million vaccine doses by January 2021.9 Agreements 
between the federal government and U.S. pharmaceutical 
                                                 
1 A Timeline of COVID–19 Developments in 2020, AJMC, 
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020 (last 




5 Mark Terry, Compare:1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Versus COVID–19, 
BIOSPACE (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.biospace.com/article/compare-1918-
spanish-influenza-pandemic-versus-covid-19/. 
6 Karen Weintraub & Elizabeth Weise, Federal spending on COVID_19 
vaccine candidates tops $9 billion, spread among 7 companies, USA 
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/08/08/feds-
spending-more-than-9-billion-covid-19-vaccine candidates/5575206002/ 
(last updated Aug. 10, 2020, 9:32 AM). 
7 Id. 
8 Explaining Operation Warp Speed, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
https://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/communicable/novel-corona-
virus-lpha/pdf/fact-sheet-operation-warp-speed.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2021) 
[hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.]. 
9 Id. 
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companies stipulate that the U.S. would receive the first batch of 
doses produced.10 For example, the U.S. and Pfizer agreed that the 
U.S. would receive the first 100 million doses, with the option to 
acquire an additional 500 million.11 The federal government in-
cluded this provision in every vaccine contract with U.S. manufac-
turers to ensure the initial batches of vaccine doses were prioritized 
for U.S. residents.12 Certainly, this favorable agreement is linked to 
the U.S.’s predominant role in vaccine funding.13 Providing $11 bil-
lion to pharmaceutical companies in the first months of the pan-
demic, the U.S.’s financial contributions to the vaccine race are un-
paralleled.14 Without this significant level of U.S. funding, manu-
facturers could have opted to sell the vaccines to nations that offered 
higher prices.15  
 U.S. pharmaceutical companies have also entered into con-
tracts to supply vaccine doses to Canada, among other countries.16 
The Canadian government committed over $1 billion in future vac-
cine contracts with several pharmaceutical companies, including 
Moderna, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and Novavax.17 These con-
tracts included up–front costs followed by incremental payments 
throughout the development process, which were contingent upon 
the successful completion of clinical trials and regulatory ap-
proval.18 By entering into these future agreements with 
                                                 
10 Noah Weiland, Denise Grady & David E. Sanger, Pfizer Gets $1.95 Billion to 
Produce Coronavirus Vaccine by Year’s End, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.ny-
times.com/2020/07/22/us/politics/pfizer-coronavirus-vaccine.html (last updated 
Nov. 10, 2020). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Richard G. Frank, Leslie Dach, & Nicole Lurie, It Was The Government That 
Produced COVID–19 Vaccine Success, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 14, 2021), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210512.191448/full/. 
14 James C. Robinson, Funding of Pharmaceutical Innovation During and After 
the COVID-19 Pandemic, JAMA (Jan. 14, 2021), https://jamanetwork.com/jour-
nals/jama/fullarticle/2775400. 
15 Weiland, supra note 10. 
16 Procuring vaccines for COVID–19, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.can-
ada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/services/procuring-vaccines-
covid19.html (last updated Oct. 7, 2021). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
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manufacturers, the Canadian government effectively secured prior-
ity access to potential vaccine doses for its residents.19  
 This article will begin by addressing the recently executed 
COVID–19 vaccine agreements between the Canadian government 
and U.S. pharmaceutical companies, and comparing these new 
agreements to previous vaccine agreements between U.S. pharma-
ceutical companies and foreign states. Part II of this article will lay 
out the relevant legal frameworks surrounding previous pandemic 
responses and future vaccine contracts. Part III of this article will 
then explore the contractual relationships between the U.S. federal 
government, the Canadian government, and U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies to dissect potential business and legal implications. Fol-
lowing that, Part IV will focus on the various ethical issues raised 
by these types of vaccine agreements, such as vaccine nationalism 
and the limited liability of vaccine manufacturers. Part V of this pa-
per will discuss the effect of these agreements on the global pan-
demic response and explore alternatives to these types of agree-
ments for future crises. Finally, Part VI will explore the various al-
ternatives to bilateral vaccine contracts—including vaccine alli-
ances, Advanced Market Commitment Models, and multilateral 
agreements—that provide equitable access to vaccines for lower and 
middle–income countries, comparing and contrasting the different 
approaches to the pandemic response, and offering insight on how 
to respond to future public health crises.  
 To shorten the timeline of the COVID–19 pandemic, coun-
tries should continue implementing a coordinated, global response. 
The creation of a global vaccine network is an integral component 
to providing equitable access to COVID–19 vaccines and mitigating 
the effects of the pandemic. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In the event of a public health emergency in the U.S., the Public 
Health Service (“PHS”) Act grants the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) the power to make critical decisions in an 
effort to address and mitigate the emergency situation.20 The PHS 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Regulations and Laws That May Apply During a Pandemic, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-
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Act serves as the basis for the HHS’ authority by permitting “the 
HHS Secretary to take key actions, such as lead all federal public 
health and medical response, declare a public health emergency, as-
sist states in meeting health emergencies, maintain the Strategic Na-
tional Stockpile, and control communicable diseases.”21  
On February 4, 2020, Alex Azar, the Secretary of the HHS, is-
sued a Declaration pursuant to the PHS Act “to provide liability im-
munity for activities related to medical countermeasures against 
COVID–19.”22 The HHS stated that when a Declaration under the 
PHS Act is in effect, “the [PHS] Act precludes, for example, liability 
claims alleging negligence by a manufacturer in creating a vaccine, 
or negligence by a health care provider in prescribing the wrong 
dose, absent willful misconduct.”23 The threshold to reach “willful 
misconduct” is high, as it requires that “the covered person act (i) 
intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without 
legal or factual justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or ob-
vious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm 
will outweigh the benefit.”24 As expected, this immunity provision 
does not cover actions grounded in “willful misconduct,” yet it co-
vers actions of negligence, even in vaccine development.25 The PHS 
Act likely included this liability shield provision to incentivize man-
ufacturers to develop vaccines in an expeditious and efficient man-
ner.26 Regardless of the intention, this provision acts as a de facto 
absolute immunity status for vaccine manufacturers.27 Given the un-
likelihood of a manufacturer engaging in willful misconduct while 
developing a vaccine, there are few legal recourses for individuals 
harmed by a newly–developed COVID–19 vaccine.28  
Manufacturers may point to the assumption of risk doctrine, as 
the patient waives certain legal remedies as a prerequisite to 
                                                 
resources/planning-preparedness/regulations-laws-during-pandemic.htm (last 






26 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 20. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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obtaining the vaccine.29 Given the novelty and unprecedented time-
line of vaccine development, there is no guarantee as to the effects 
of the vaccine.30 Without inserting a waiver and assumption of risk 
provision in the vaccine contracts, manufacturers would find them-
selves in a vulnerable position that would likely open the floodgates 
of litigation.31 
In Canada, the federal government’s public health power comes 
from several sources.32 The first source is the power to quarantine 
pursuant to Canada’s Constitution Act.33 Under Section 91 of the 
Constitution Act, “the federal government derives its jurisdiction to 
directly or indirectly regulate on public health–related issues princi-
pally from its powers to legislate on quarantine.”34 Further, the Con-
stitution Act provides the federal government with the power to 
make laws “for the peace, order and good government of Canada.”35 
Two laws have been passed that specifically address the federal gov-
ernment’s emergency powers.36 The first, the 2007 Emergency 
Management Act, provides a framework to assist provinces in the 
event of an emergency and to coordinate responsive actions between 
the federal government and provinces.37  
The second piece of legislation, The Emergencies Act of 1985, 
provides the federal government authority to declare a national 
emergency and act unilaterally.38 This Act grants the federal gov-
ernment more power than the 2007 Emergency Management Act in 
that the government is not required to collaborate with the provinces 
in crafting an emergency response.39 However, questions arise 




32 Amy Swiffen, The limits of Canada’s federal emergency law during the coro-




34 Legal Responses to Health Emergencies, LIBRARY OF CONG. 39 (Feb. 2015), 
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/ser-
vice/ll/llglrd/2014504236/2014504236.pdf. 
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surrounding the effectiveness of these laws given that the federal 
government may take action only after the effects of the pandemic 
have surpassed the provincial response capacities.40  
A. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) 
1.  History 
The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (“PIP”) Framework is the 
sole international legal tool regarding equitable vaccine distribu-
tion.41 The PIP Framework was adopted in 2011 to apply a global 
approach to influenza pandemics, and governs all 194 member states 
of the WHO.42  
 2.  Objectives 
The objectives of the PIP Framework are to “improve and 
strengthen the sharing of influenza viruses with human pandemic 
potential; and to increase the access of developing countries to vac-
cines and other pandemic related supplies.”43 Pursuant to this frame-
work, the WHO seeks to organize influenza vaccine distribution to 
countries that have obtained vaccine contracts with manufacturers.44 
The vaccine rollout under PIP is typically affected by countries’ re-
spective health needs.45 However, given the global impact of the 
COVID–19 pandemic, vaccine doses are in high demand in virtually 
every country worldwide.46 Vaccines, as a result, have been distrib-
uted based on priority access rather than on a need basis.47  
                                                 
40 Id. 
41 Alexandra L. Phelan, Mark Eccleston–Turner, Michelle Rourke, Allan 
Maleche & Chenguang Wang, Legal agreements: barriers and enablers to 
global equitable COVID–19 vaccine access, THE LANCET (Sept. 7, 2020), 
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)31873-
0/fulltext. 
42 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, WHO, 
https://www.who.int/initiatives/pandemic-influenza-preparedness-framework 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2021) [hereinafter PIP Framework]. 
43 Id. 
44 Phelan et al., supra note 41. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Jennifer Tolbert, Jennifer Kates, & Josh Michaud, The COVID–19 Vaccine 
Priority Line Continues to Change as States Make Further Updates, KFF (Jan. 
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B. COVID–19 Law Lab 
1.  History 
Due to the novel nature of the global COVID–19 pandemic, a 
perfect international legal framework has not yet been put in place.48 
But despite the fact that there is no universal legal instrument spe-
cific to COVID–19, the majority of countries worldwide are bound 
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ICESCR”).49 Pursuant to this agreement, member nations 
must “take steps, individually and through international assistance, 
to realise the right to health and the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific research and its applications, without discrimination.”50 
Taking steps to realize these rights would likely translate to ensuring 
equitable availability and access for member countries.51 Although 
the PIP Framework is the sole legal precedent for international vac-
cine distribution, it has yet to apply to a pandemic of this magni-
tude.52 To counter the effects of the COVID–19 pandemic, the 
United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”), WHO, the 
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and the 
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health at Georgetown Uni-
versity collaborated in July 2020 to develop the COVID–19 Law 
Lab.53 
 2. Objectives 
The COVID–19 Law Lab is a collection of legal documents and 
resources from more than 190 countries worldwide compiled to aid 
countries in implementing legal frameworks to control the pan-
demic.54 The COVID–19 Law Lab is based off of the work of the 
UHC Legal Solutions Network, an entity that was created to assist 
                                                 
21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/the-covid-19-vaccine-priority-line-
continues-to-change-as-states-make-further-updates/. 





53About the Collaboration, COVID–19 L. LAB, https://covidlawlab.org/about-
the-collaboration/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2021). 
54 Id. 
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countries in “achiev[ing] universal health coverage through the im-
plementation of rights–based legal frameworks.”55 The principal ob-
jective of this initiative is to provide a framework for countries to 
safeguard the health of residents, while adhering to international hu-
man rights standards.56 The project also aims to help countries eval-
uate and improve upon their current legal and public health sys-
tems.57 Following the launch of this initiative, countries now have 
access to an expansive database of legal frameworks and are in a 
position to reform legislation, particularly on the subject of vaccine 
development and approval.58  
C. Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) 
1.  History 
Advance Purchase Agreements (“APAs”) are “pre–purchases” 
of vaccines that have not yet been developed or approved for the 
general public.59 Through this legal instrument, a country pledges to 
purchase a fixed amount or a percentage of future vaccine doses 
from a vaccine manufacturer, pending research and development, 
public health approval, licensing, manufacturing, and distribution.60 
The U.S. government entered into APAs with multiple pharmaceu-
tical companies, including Pfizer and Novavax, among others.61 The 
federal government typically does not execute APAs with pharma-
ceutical companies, as public insurers and the private sector typi-
cally purchase vaccine doses.62 However, given the urgent need for 
                                                 
55New COVID–19 Law Lab to provide legal information and support for 






59 Nicholson Price, Rachel Sachs, Jacob S. Sherkow & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, 
Covid–19 Vaccine Advance Purchases Explained, HARVARD L. SCHOOL BILL OF 
HEALTH (Aug. 11, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.har-
vard.edu/2020/08/11/covid19-vaccine-advance-purchases-explained/. 
60 Phelan et al., supra note 41. 
61 Price et al., supra note 59. 
62 Id. 
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COVID–19 vaccinations across the U.S., the federal government 
has assumed control of the allocation and distribution process.63  
 2.  Objectives 
APAs offer numerous benefits to both the participating country 
and the vaccine manufacturer.64 By securing COVID–19 vaccine 
doses ahead of time, countries have helped mitigate the significant 
health and economic costs posed by the pandemic.65 And although 
purchasing a vaccine that has not yet been developed was inherently 
risky, this practice accelerated each stage of the typical vaccine 
timeline, from production to distribution.66 Some studies have 
shown that, even under a conservative analysis, the net benefit of 
investments in potential COVID–19 vaccines is substantial.67 One 
study estimates that investing in one vaccine manufacturer to vac-
cinate 20% of a country’s population would cost the investing coun-
try $2.6 billion, yet provide $8.7 billion in benefits.68 The net gain 
of $6.1 billion is realized through avoiding significant health costs, 
such as medical care related to COVID–19 and economic costs—
the investment has allowed countries to reopen the economy and al-
low industries to recover from the pandemic.69 Applying the previ-
ous example on a larger scale, investing in three candidates to vac-
cinate 60% of the population would cost $19 billion, yet provide $35 
billion in benefits, rendering a net gain of $16 billion.70 Another 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 Arthur Baker, Juan Camilo Castillo, Greg Larson, Alex Tabarrok & Brandon 
Tan, 3 reasons why countries should purchase COVID–19 vaccines at risk, 
INTER–AM. DEV. BANK (Nov. 9, 2020), https://blogs.iadb.org/salud/en/coun-
tries-covid-19-vaccines/. 
65 Richard G. Frank, Leslie Dach, & Nicole Lurie, It Was The Government That 
Produced COVID–19 Vaccine Success, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 14, 2021), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210512.191448/full/. 
66 Baker et al., supra note 64. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Joseph E. Gagnon, Steven Kamin, & John Kearns, Economic costs and bene-
fits of accelerated COVID–19 vaccinations, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 
(May 2021), https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/economic-costs-
and-benefits-accelerated-covid-19-vaccinations (“[A] faster pace of vaccination 
that hastens the end of the pandemic by 10 months would lead to an additional 
$970 billion in world GDP.”). 
70 Baker et al., supra note 64. 
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benefit of APAs is that the urgency and competition inherent in the 
race to develop a novel COVID–19 vaccine oftentimes drives inno-
vation and leads to a more efficient method of vaccine development 
for future crises.71 
However, critics of APAs have argued that these legal tools only 
benefit developed countries with sufficient financial resources to se-
cure COVID–19 vaccine doses, and only serve to act as a barrier for 
developing countries to obtain vaccines.72 It is argued that the exe-
cution of APAs between developed countries and vaccine manufac-
turers may serve as an obstacle to global equitable access to vac-
cines.73 Moreover, bilateral APAs, while beneficial for the countries 
involved, arguably widen existing inequities between developed and 
developing countries and continue to extend the timeline of the pan-
demic.74  
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF VACCINE AGREEMENTS 
A. Contracts Between the U.S. and U.S. Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
To expedite the development and distribution of a COVID–19 
vaccine, the U.S. government initiated Operation Warp Speed in 
May 2020.75 The objective of this operation was to produce and dis-
tribute 300 million vaccine doses by January 2021.76 The standard 
timeline for vaccine development, from research and development 
to distribution, is roughly six years.77 However, by accelerating each 
component of the process, Operation Warp Speed aims to develop a 
vaccine in an unprecedented timeline of 14 months.78 This acceler-
ated approach involves the collaboration of multiple government 
agencies, including the HHS, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”), the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), 
the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), and the Department of 
                                                 
71 Price et al., supra note 59. 
72 Phelan et al., supra note 41. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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Defense (“DOD”), among others.79 The federal government has thus 
far executed vaccine agreements with the following companies: No-
vavax, Johnson & Johnson, Moderna, and Pfizer.80 
Under its agreement with the U.S., Novavax would secure 
roughly $1.7 billion in U.S. funding to develop a COVID–19 vac-
cine.81 In return, the government, specifically the HHS and DOD, 
would receive the first 100 million doses produced by Novavax,82 
and U.S. residents would receive the vaccine at no cost.83 One po-
tential area of concern with this agreement was the fact that the 
agreement between the federal government and Novavax was bro-
kered by a third party, Advanced Technology International.84 Typi-
cally, these types of agreements are negotiated directly between the 
manufacturer and the federal government without an external 
party.85 The government has expressed concerns surrounding the in-
volvement of a third party in the agreement, particularly toward the 
potential exclusion of safeguards, including those that counter 
price–gouging.86 However, to circumvent this provision, the gov-
ernment may technically opt to “march–in” and exercise its powers 
of eminent domain.87 The Johnson & Johnson agreement is similar 
to Novavax’s. The Johnson & Johnson contract with the U.S. was 
valued at just over $1 billion and provided that the U.S. would re-
ceive the first 100 million doses of its vaccine.88 Like the Novavax 
                                                 
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
81Novavax COVID–19 Vaccine Granted Fast Track Designation by U.S. FDA, 
NOVAVAX (Nov. 9, 2020), https://ir.novavax.com/2020-11-09-Novavax-
COVID-19-Vaccine-Granted-Fast-Track-Designation-by-U-S-FDA. 
82HHS, DOD Collaborate with Novavax to Produce Millions of COVID-19 In-
vestigational Vaccine Doses in Commercial–Scale Manufacturing Demonstra-




84 Sydney Lupkin, Novavax Posts Coronavirus Vaccine Contract That Govern-
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agreement, the Johnson & Johnson contract was brokered by a third 
party and omitted typical protections such as those safeguarding 
against price–gouging.89 
The U.S.’s agreements with the remaining vaccine companies 
are also worth examining. U.S. government and Moderna reached 
an agreement where the U.S. would provide $1.5 billion to develop 
a vaccine.90 In exchange, the government received the first 100 mil-
lion vaccine doses, with an option to purchase an additional 400 mil-
lion.91 Unlike the government’s previous agreements, the agreement 
with Moderna remains largely undisclosed to the public.92 However, 
it does include a similar “march–in” clause for the government to 
assume control of the vaccine if Moderna does not make it “reason-
ably” available.93 Moderna’s agreement can be compared with 
Pfizer’s—pursuant to its agreement with the U.S., Pfizer would re-
ceive $1.95 billion in funding to distribute a COVID–19 vaccine.94 
However, Pfizer is the sole company that refused to accept federal 
funding in the research and development stage, opting instead to re-
ceive funding for distribution purposes.95 Pfizer reasoned that fed-
eral funding would have delayed the vaccine’s path to clinical tri-
als.96 Unlike the other agreements, the agreement with Pfizer pro-
vided that the first 100 million doses would be produced before the 
end of 2020.97 Once this occurred, the federal government was able 
to exercise the option to secure up to 500 million more doses.98  






94 Weiland et al., supra note 10. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Ankur Banerjee & Vishwadha Chander, Pfizer, U.S. strike 100 million 
COVID–19 vaccine deal with 70 million due by June, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 
2020, 7:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-
pfizer-idUSKBN28X1GC (“[T]he company halved its 2020 production target 
due to manufacturing issues…”). 
98 Pfizer And BioNTech To Provide 500 Million Doses of COVID–19 Vaccine To 
U.S. Government For Donation To Poorest Nations, PFIZER (June 10, 2021, 2:00 
AM), https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizer-
and-biontech-provide-500-million-doses-covid-19 (“Pfizer . . . and BioNTech . . 
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 1. Accelerated Vaccine Development Timeline 
Given the inherent urgency to create a vaccine at the height of a 
global pandemic, biotech companies fast–tracked and continue to 
fast–track the development timeline.99 Typically, clinical develop-
ment of vaccines occurs in three phases.100 This process is sequen-
tial and contingent upon the results of the previous phases.101 How-
ever, companies have consolidated significant steps in the vaccine 
development process by simultaneously performing different phases 
of clinical trials.102 Since the development of the COVID–19 vac-
cine was grounded in novel technology that had not formed the basis 
for previous vaccines,103 its accelerated timeline raised concerns 
over the effectiveness and safety of COVID–19 vaccines.104  
 2. Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 
Moreover, the accelerated development of a COVID–19 vaccine 
continues to raise multiple legal concerns.105 One such issue may 
arise if a company were to secure a patent so that it is the exclusive 
producer of the COVID–19 vaccine.106 In this situation, the federal 
government could theoretically invoke the power of eminent domain 
to grant other manufacturers the right to produce the vaccine.107 Pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498, in cases where the federal government 
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uses or manufactures a patent without the owner’s license, “the 
owner’s remedy shall be by action against the U.S. . . . for the re-
covery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and 
manufacture.”108 Congress passed the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 for 
this specific purpose.109 This act provides for patents on inventions 
to be exclusively licensed if they were supplemented by federal 
funding.110 Because the majority of vaccine manufacturers have ac-
cepted federal aid in developing potential vaccines, they are accord-
ingly subject to the federal government’s eminent domain powers 
authorized by the Bayh–Dole Act.111 
Specifically, the Act allows the government to “march–in” and 
grant licenses to other actors in particular circumstances.112 Accord-
ing to 35 U.S.C. § 203, the government may exercise its march–in 
rights if it determines that “action is necessary to alleviate health or 
safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor, 
assignee, or their licensees.”113 This approach is unlikely given the 
fact that the federal government has never exercised its march–in 
rights on a patent in the history of the Bayh–Dole Act.114 Neverthe-
less, the emergence of an unprecedented global health crisis may 
cause the government to consider exercising this power.115 The U.S. 
government would likely invoke this power if a pharmaceutical 
company failed to make the COVID–19 vaccine available “on rea-
sonable terms.”116  
One example of failing to adhere to the clause “on reasonable 
terms” includes setting prohibitively high prices for products, which 
is not an atypical practice in the pharmaceutical industry. Normally, 
pharmaceutical companies offer their products at steep prices to 
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recoup the significant investment in researching, developing, and 
manufacturing their product.117 However, because the government 
provided billions in federal funding to U.S.–based companies work-
ing towards developing vaccine candidates as part of Operation 
Warp Speed, these companies were able to assume less financial risk 
throughout the process.118 As such, concerns over profit margins 
were mitigated by the government’s research grants.119 From a do-
mestic perspective, U.S. pharmaceutical companies do not offer the 
vaccinations to the consumer directly, as the government controls 
allocation.120 Additionally, because the vaccine doses were funded 
and purchased by U.S. taxpayer dollars, vaccine providers offer vac-
cinations to U.S. residents free of charge.121 The federal govern-
ment, as a result, is less inclined to exercise its “march in” rights 
because the government controls the distribution process.122  
B. Contracts Between Canada and U.S. Pharmaceutical 
Companies 
The U.S. plays a fundamental role in vaccine development, as 
the U.S. market constitutes 60% of vaccine–related profits world-
wide.123 U.S. companies have previously made agreements with for-
eign countries to supply vaccine doses.124 For instance, in 2019, the 
Canadian government executed an agreement with Seqirus, a U.S. 
vaccine company, as a secondary influenza vaccine supplier in the 
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case of a flu outbreak.125 In a typical year, the Canadian government 
would notify one of its routine influenza vaccine suppliers and place 
an order depending on demand.126 The primary difference between 
previous APAs and COVID–19 vaccine APAs is that Canada had 
contracts in place for previous flu outbreaks, whereas now the coun-
try has had to negotiate with multiple nations to secure APAs over 
the course of the pandemic.127  
Canada’s practice of executing APAs with several vaccine man-
ufacturers in an attempt to secure future vaccine doses, with the total 
count at roughly five vaccines per Canadian, has raised the issue of 
“vaccine nationalism.”128 This trend of purchasing large batches of 
vaccines prior to their development has drawn criticism from lower 
and middle–income countries as coming into conflict with a more 
coordinated global strategy.129 However, the issue of vaccine na-
tionalism raised by APAs for future vaccine doses is not new.130 Of-
ten, vaccines developed by U.S. companies and other companies 
based in developed nations are too costly for developing countries 
to afford.131 This trend is due in part to the expensive and time–con-
suming process of vaccine development.132 For example, the re-
search, development, and distribution of a novel vaccine may 
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require over ten years of commitment and hundreds of millions of 
dollars.133 
The Canadian government and multiple U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies executed agreements for future COVID–19 vaccine 
doses.134 The Canadian government, advised by the Public Services 
and Procurement Canada (“PSPC”), the Public Health Agency of 
Canada (“PHAC”), Health Canada and Innovation, and Science and 
Economic Development Canada, has since invested more than $9 
billion in securing APAs with various vaccine manufacturers.135  
More specifically, Canada executed contracts with the following 
companies: Novavax for 76 million doses, Johnson & Johnson for 
38 million doses, Moderna for 56 million doses, and Pfizer for a 
minimum of 20 million doses.136 These agreements, which were 
contingent upon successful completion of clinical trials and a license 
from Health Canada, provided for the delivery of doses in early 
2021.137 
Canada and Novavax reached an agreement whereby Canada 
would receive 76 million doses of Novavax’s potential COVID–19 
vaccine pending approval from Health Canada, the agency respon-
sible for federal health policy.138 Although the financial terms of the 
agreement have yet to be disclosed, the Canadian government is 
likely paying a substantial premium relative to that of the U.S. gov-
ernment.139 Canada will likely have to pay a higher price due to its 
hands–off approach in the research and development, manufactur-
ing, and distribution phases, relative to that of the U.S.140 Nonethe-
less, the Canadian government executed a similar agreement with 
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another U.S.–based pharmaceutical company, Johnson & Johnson, 
for 38 million doses of a future COVID–19 vaccine.141 Neither party 
has disclosed the financial terms of the agreement in principle, 
which was contingent upon the vaccine candidate’s safety and effi-
cacy and subject to Health Canada’s approval.142 Nor have the fi-
nancial terms of Canada’s agreement with Moderna for 56 million 
doses been disclosed.143  
Lastly, Pfizer and the Canadian government reached an agree-
ment in principle for 20 million doses of Pfizer’s vaccine candidate, 
with the option in January 2021 to purchase 20 million additional 
doses.144 The distribution of the vaccine is subject to regulatory ap-
proval and was realized in December 2020.145 Nevertheless, the Ca-
nadian government has been outspoken in its criticism towards 
Pfizer’s vaccine distribution process.146 According to the Ontario 
Premier Doug Ford, Pfizer has delayed its vaccine deliveries to Can-
ada to increase production in its Belgian plant, which provides vac-
cine deliveries outside the U.S.147  
The delay in vaccine distribution not only affects the amount of 
people who can receive vaccinations, but also the precise period of 
time in which high–risk candidates are expecting to receive both 
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doses.148 The U.S. government’s agreement with Pfizer stipulates 
that all vaccines produced in the Michigan facility are to be distrib-
uted in the U.S.149 Pursuant to the Canadian government’s contract 
with Pfizer, Canada’s doses are to be delivered from Pfizer’s factory 
in Belgium.150 Canada has reached out to the U.S. government in an 
attempt to secure doses from the Pfizer facility in Michigan, alt-
hough Pfizer is not permitted to provide Canada with vaccines from 
the U.S. facility.151 Canada eventually received vaccine doses from 
Pfizer pursuant to the vaccine contract.152 
IV. POTENTIAL ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY VACCINE 
AGREEMENTS 
A. Vaccine Nationalism 
Throughout all global pandemics, wealthier nations have tradi-
tionally negotiated contracts with vaccine manufacturers to secure 
doses for their citizens.153 In 2009, at the height of the Swine Flu 
pandemic, wealthy countries entered into APAs with vaccine man-
ufacturers to secure doses of the newly–developed vaccine.154 As a 
result, developed countries, including the U.S., were able to reserve 
bulk orders of vaccine doses through APAs while poorer countries 
had fewer opportunities to do so.155 The use of bilateral APAs was 
so prevalent during the H1N1 pandemic “that more than 56% of 
pandemic influenza manufacturers surveyed by WHO were unable 
to commit to guaranteeing 10% of real–time vaccine production for 
purchase by UN agencies due to pre–existing commitments under 
APAs with HICs [high–income countries].”156 This trend led to an 
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inequitable distribution of swine flu vaccines among developed and 
developing countries, rooted primarily in purchasing power as op-
posed to public health risk and need.157  
Moreover, Canada has implemented a process of securing con-
tracts with vaccine manufacturers while demand is low in order to 
ensure that the country has access to vaccines in the event of a public 
health emergency.158 During the H1N1 pandemic, Canada’s public 
health response proved to be effective: the PHAC noted that “Can-
ada’s preparedness allowed it to have one of the highest H1N1 im-
munization rates in the world.”159 Following the H1N1 pandemic, 
the PHAC published a report on which actions helped Canada to 
counter the health emergency.160 Of the four key activities listed, 
two were based on the existence of vaccine contracts: “[m]anaging 
a contract with a domestic manufacturer to develop a vaccine” and 
“arranging a contract with Public Works and Government Services 
Canada (now Public Services and Procurement Canada) for the pur-
chase of sufficient vaccines for Canadians on behalf of the provinces 
and territories.”161 This strategy, however, is only beneficial during 
an influenza pandemic, as vaccine manufacturers that have negoti-
ated with Canada are solely required to supply influenza vaccines.162 
Specifically, these agreements are restricted to influenza vaccines, 
so the Canadian government would have to renegotiate the terms of 
the agreements to include COVID–19 vaccines.163 These types of 
agreements with vaccine manufacturers do not anticipate a non–in-
fluenza pandemic, and thus left Canada searching for new vaccine 
contracts with other manufacturers amidst a public health emer-
gency.164 Given Canada’s lack of production and supply chain ca-
pacity, the country was forced to enter into agreements with other 
nations to ensure its residents receive vaccinations.165 
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1. Disparity Between Wealthy and Non–Wealthy Nations 
The People’s Vaccine Alliance released a report in December of 
2020 which pointed to the fact that wealthy nations making up 14% 
of the world’s population had already pre–purchased over 50% of 
potential COVID–19 vaccines worldwide.166 Similar reports have 
estimated that Canada has been pre–purchasing vaccines in excess, 
with as many as five vaccines per person.167 On the other hand, in 
low and middle–income countries, including Brazil and Indonesia, 
the ratio of pre–purchased vaccines to people is roughly one vaccine 
to every fourth person.168 The U.S., for example, has set aside 800 
million doses despite only having a population of roughly 330 mil-
lion people.169 Similarly, Japan, Australia, and Canada pre–pur-
chased a combined one billion vaccine doses even though these 
three nations make up less than 1% of current COVID–19 cases 
globally.170 These trends demonstrate that vaccines are being over–
purchased with respect to total population and COVID–19 case 
count.171 To illustrate the disparity between developing and devel-
oped nations, high and middle–income countries have received 
more than 80% of doses worldwide, while only 1% of people in 
low–income countries have received at least on dose.172 The practice 
of bidding for bilateral agreements artificially has raised the pur-
chase price for vaccine doses, which in turn has negatively impacted 
non–wealthy countries that do not have comparable financial re-
sources.173  
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2. Inequitable Distribution and Opportunity 
The vaccine nationalism approach of U.S. manufacturers enter-
ing into APAs with wealthy countries has, and will likely continue 
to, lead to an inefficient distribution of vaccine doses, providing 
more opportunity for lower–risk individuals in wealthier countries 
as opposed to higher–risk individuals in developing countries.174 
Developing nations have not possessed the requisite infrastructure 
and technology found in more developed nations to carry out the 
entire vaccine cycle, from manufacturing to distribution.175 In con-
trast to developing nations, high–income countries have increased 
access to vaccine doses because of the sophisticated infrastructure 
needed to distribute and preserve them.176 For example, many vac-
cines must be shipped in climate–controlled containers and stored in 
cold temperatures.177 But low and middle–income countries, even 
those that are able to secure vaccine doses independently or with 
assistance, do not have the infrastructure to meet these requirements 
to ensure the vaccine doses remain effective.178 Without a concerted 
approach among countries, there is a higher likelihood that vaccine 
supply chains will stall and not reach their maximum potential.179 
To date, vaccine manufacturing capacities remain below the level 
needed to meet demand, with only several nations being able to pro-
duce vaccines.180  
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B. Manufacturers’ Limited Liability Under the Public 
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act 
1. Background  
Other ethical concerns arise throughout the process of vaccine 
development.181 In an effort to expedite the development of a vac-
cine, the HHS will likely limit liability for manufacturers under the 
PREP Act.182 The PREP Act was passed in 2005, as Public Law 
109–148, Division C, Section 2, under the Bush administration to 
manage public health emergencies by safeguarding vaccine manu-
facturers from incurring most forms of liability, thereby incentiviz-
ing manufacturers to produce a vaccine as quickly as possible.183 In 
order to invoke the PREP Act, the Secretary of HHS “must deter-
mine that a disease or other threat to health constitutes a public 
health emergency, or that there is a credible risk of such an emer-
gency.”184 The Secretary is required to publish the PREP Act decla-
ration in the Federal Register and “identify, for each countermeas-
ure, the particular disease, time period, population, and geographical 
area that the declaration covers.” As long as the COVID–19 PREP 
Act Declaration is in effect, vaccine manufacturers, distributors, and 
health care providers are mostly immune from legal liability for 
losses stemming from the vaccine.185 
2. Purpose 
The PREP Act was passed to widen the scope of immunity from 
liability for covered persons.186 Pursuant to this Act, “covered per-
sons—including COVID–19 vaccine developers, manufacturers, 
[and] distributors . . . are generally immune from legal liability for 
losses relating to administration or use of an FDA–approved 
COVID–19 vaccine.”187 If a covered person falls within the scope 
of immunity, the PREP Act immunizes a covered person from legal 
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liability for all claims for loss relating to the administration.188 The 
requirements for PREP act immunity are as follows: “(1) the indi-
vidual or entity must be a ‘covered person,’ (2) the legal claim must 
be for a ‘loss,’ (3) the loss must have a ‘causal relationship’ to the 
administration or use of a covered countermeasure, and (4) the med-
ical product that caused the loss must be a ‘covered countermeas-
ure.’”189  
However, individuals may seek recourse for damages sustained 
as a result of willful misconduct leading to death or serious injury.190 
Under these circumstances, an individual may pursue damages 
through the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program 
(“CICP”), a mechanism overseen by the HHS.191 The CICP pro-
vides an exception to the liability immunity for covered persons: 
“[a]n individual seriously injured or killed by the administration of 
a covered countermeasure, whether or not as a result of willful mis-
conduct, may seek compensation through CICP.”192 This program 
is funded by Congress via emergency appropriations to the Covered 
Countermeasure Process Fund.193 Although the CICP offers reme-
dies for individuals who suffer damages as a result of a COVID–19 
vaccine, the program is independent of the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program (“VICP”).194 The VICP provides remedies 
for injuries caused by routine vaccines in the U.S., while the CICP 
exclusively applies to vaccines covered by a PREP Act declaration 
of a public health emergency, such as the COVID–19 pandemic, in-
fluenza pandemic, and the Ebola virus.195 
Canada, on the other hand, has yet to declare a federal act related 
to the COVID–19 pandemic.196 Similar to the federalism framework 
in the U.S., each province in Canada retains power independent 
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from that of the federal government.197 As such, the federal govern-
ment of Canada would be required to collaborate with the individual 
provinces in crafting an emergency response to the effects of the 
pandemic, pursuant to the 2007 Emergency Management Act.198 
However, if the federal government declared a national emergency, 
it could theoretically implement an emergency response for the en-
tire nation without having to coordinate with the provinces.199 This 
piece of legislation, The Emergencies Act of 1985, grants the federal 
government unilateral power to implement a public health strategy, 
acting as a last resort in a public health crisis.200 However, Canada 
has never declared a national public health emergency in its his-
tory.201 As a result, the federal emergency declarations have never 
been tested and the efficacy of both acts remains unknown.202 
Moreover, the Canadian government does not have an urgent 
need to implement emergency acts limiting legal liability for vac-
cine manufacturers, vaccine developers, and others involved in the 
administration of a potential vaccine due to the lack of domestic vac-
cine development, production, and distribution.203 The Canadian 
government has primarily been entering into APAs with foreign 
vaccine manufacturers as opposed to funding the vaccine develop-
ment process domestically.204 While numerous countries around the 
world raced to develop the first successful COVID–19 vaccine, Can-
ada was unable to compete in vaccine production––an issue dating 
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back decades.205 The Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, ex-
plained that the nation does not possess sufficient supply chain ca-
pability to mass produce a COVID–19 vaccine, even if one could 
have been produced domestically.206 According to Earl Brown, an 
infectious disease expert and former member of the swine flu vac-
cine task group in Canada, “[w]e had great vaccine producers in 
Canada– world leaders essentially– 50 years ago.”207 Canadian 
manufacturers, including Connaught Laboratories in Toronto and 
Institut Armand Frappier in Montreal, were known producers of in-
sulin, inoculants, and vaccines.208 However, these companies were 
unable to generate enough profit to remain competitive and were 
eventually absorbed by or sold to foreign companies.209  
Although some Canadian companies, such as Medicago in Que-
bec and VIDO–InterVac in Saskatchewan, have been progressing 
towards developing a successful vaccine candidate, these companies 
would be unable to mass produce vaccines at a level to supply all 
Canadians.210 Looking to the future, Canadian pharmaceutical com-
panies intend to develop supply chains that would produce vaccines 
regularly to anticipate future public health emergencies.211 One 
company, VIDO–InterVac, plans to construct a facility to manufac-
ture vaccines, but the process will take time.212 For the foreseeable 
future, Canada will be forced to rely on foreign vaccine manufactur-
ers to obtain vaccine doses.213 Canada has received vaccines from 
U.S. manufacturers, specifically Johnson & Johnson, Moderna, and 
Pfizer, over the course of 2021.214 As of October 2021, nearly 75% 
of the population is fully vaccinated.215 
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V. GLOBAL PANDEMIC RESPONSE 
A. Effect of Bilateral APAs 
Many wealthy nations began entering into bilateral APAs with 
manufacturers as the pandemic grew worse.216 Countries with sig-
nificant financial resources had the opportunity to secure vaccine 
doses before the vaccines were even developed.217 While bilateral 
agreements may be beneficial in the short term, they fail to address 
the larger issue of global herd immunity.218 Even if the nation that 
executed the bilateral APA were to achieve herd immunity domes-
tically, the rest of the world would lag behind, potentially posing 
lasting public health problems.219 This process may have a signifi-
cant negative impact on affected countries’ relations moving for-
ward.220 
 However, bilateral APAs yield significant advantages.221 
The inherent competition among vaccine manufacturers to produce 
the first successful COVID–19 vaccine has driven innovation and 
has likely altered the vaccine development process for the better 
moving forward.222 Typically, the timeline for vaccine develop-
ment, ranging from research through distribution, is nearly six 
years.223 Given the urgency and increased demand for a vaccine, 
pharmaceutical companies have sought to complete development 
within a fraction of that time.224 This unprecedented and accelerated 
method may provide the blueprint to produce a safe and effective 
vaccine in future public health emergencies.225 Proponents of APAs 
argue that the far–reaching benefits of producing a successful 
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vaccine outweigh the costs of funding multiple pharmaceutical com-
panies and the risk of several vaccine candidates failing.226  
1. Impact on Global Pandemic 
Without a continued collaborative approach, the timeframe of 
the COVID–19 pandemic will continue to extend, leading to higher 
economic costs and public health concerns.227 We now know that 
the lack of access to a COVID–19 vaccine worldwide hindered the 
global economy, particularly high–contact industries including tour-
ism, health care, and retail.228 One study shows the effect on global 
GDP in the absence of worldwide access to effective vaccines that 
would permit high–contact sectors to return to normal levels of ac-
tivity.229 This report indicated that roughly $3.4 trillion in global 
GDP may be lost per year, even when operating under the assump-
tion that countries will not revert back to home confinement and 
lockdown measures.230 Although bilateral agreements may improve 
a nation’s public health and economic outlook, they have minimal 
impact on the duration of a global pandemic.231 In order to return to 
a sense of normalcy, ‘herd immunity’ will need to be realized.232 
This phenomenon refers to “the indirect protection from an infec-
tious disease that happens when a population is immune either 
through vaccination or immunity developed through previous infec-
tion.” However, according to the WHO, herd immunity should only 
be achieved through vaccination due to the potential negative health 
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effects of infection.233 The most effective way to vaccinate a signif-
icant proportion of the world’s population, as we have seen, is 
through a concerted, global effort to provide equitable vaccine ac-
cess.234 
B. Potential Alternatives 
Global health entities can nonetheless continue to execute APAs 
to obtain vaccine doses for developing countries and other countries 
that do not have equitable access to newly–developed vaccines.235 
This process can occur through an Advanced Market Commitment 
(“AMC”) model, where donors pledge to fund the purchase of a po-
tential vaccine intended for developing countries that are unable to 
front the cost.236 For example, in 2007, five countries along with the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation pledged $1.5 billion to create the 
first AMC.237 Through this initiative, the AMC was able to secure 
pneumococcal vaccines for low and middle–income nations in 
need.238 In June 2021, multiple countries pledged roughly $2.4 bil-
lion in vaccine doses at an AMC.239  
1. Advanced Market Commitment Models (AMCs) 
i. Gavi: The Vaccine Alliance 
Other models have proven to be effective in committing funds 
to obtain vaccine doses for developing countries, including the In-
ternational Finance Facility for Immunisation (“IFFlm”).240 This 
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organization raises funds for vaccines through the use of bonds and 
is part of The Vaccine Alliance (“Gavi”),241 Gavi has partnered with 
other organizations including the WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, with the goal of increas-
ing equitable access to vaccines worldwide.242 Gavi was founded in 
2000 and serves as a conduit between vaccine manufacturers and 
developing countries that otherwise would not be able to afford 
high–priced vaccines.243 Through this model, Gavi has been able to 
vaccinate nearly half of the children worldwide.244 Gavi’s proven 
track record in obtaining vaccines for low and middle–income coun-
tries has provided the alliance significant bargaining power when 
dealing with vaccine manufacturers.245 For example, in the U.S., the 
estimated overall cost to vaccinate a child with the eleven WHO–
recommended vaccines is $1,100 per child.246 However, in countries 
supported by Gavi, the total cost of providing the same vaccines is 
$28.247  
ii. COVAX 
COVAX is one of the three components of the Access to 
COVID–19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, which was launched in April 
of 2020 by the WHO, the European Commission, and France to 
counter the COVID–19 pandemic.248 COVAX links governments, 
global health organizations, vaccine manufacturers, scientists, the 
private sector, civil society, and philanthropists with the ultimate 
goal of ensuring equitable access to COVID–19 vaccines, diagnos-
tics, and treatments.249 Additionally, COVAX is coordinated by 
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the Coalition for Epidemic Prepared-
ness Innovations (“CEPI”), and the WHO, and intends to reach its 
objectives by backing the research, development, and 
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manufacturing of vaccine candidates and negotiating purchase 
prices.250 Without this “lifeline,” many lower and middle–income 
countries that are unable to execute APAs and independently pur-
chase vaccine doses would be plagued by this virus indefinitely.251 
This solution offers all participating nations––regardless of wealth–
–a unique symbiotic relationship: “it . . . provide[s] direct protection 
by increasing their chances of securing vaccine doses . . . . [y]et, at 
the same time by procuring COVID–19 vaccines through COVAX, 
these nations will also indirectly protect their citizens by reducing 
the chances of resurgence by ensuring that the rest of the world gets 
access to doses too.”252 
 The objective of this initiative is to have two billion vaccine 
doses accessible by the end of 2021, primarily for frontline 
healthcare workers and high–risk populations.253 By creating a 
global, collaborative vaccine network, low and middle–income 
countries, who would not have been able to front the cost for APAs, 
can now obtain vaccine doses for their residents.254 As part of the 
initiative, the first deliveries of vaccine doses are expected to go to 
lower–income nations who are unable to execute APAs with vaccine 
manufacturers.255 Moreover, even countries that have APAs in place 
would still benefit from COVAX in the event that they are unable to 
secure enough doses from the manufacturers.256 As such, both de-
veloped and developing countries have an incentive to join the col-
laboration and help coordinate a global pandemic response.257 
 Another aspect of COVAX is the Gavi COVAX AMC, 
which was launched to ensure that the ninety two lower and middle–
income countries lacking the financial resources to independently 
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afford COVID–19 vaccines would be able to gain the same access 
to vaccines as higher–income countries.258 Although lower and mid-
dle–income countries can participate in the general COVAX pro-
gram, COVAX AMC is an independent branch which keeps the 
funds raised by self–financing participants separate from funds 
raised through Official Development Assistance (“ODA”), philan-
thropy, and the private sector.259 
 However, numerous criticisms have been raised about 
COVAX and its methods.260 Critics point to COVAX’s practice of 
negotiating prices for lower and middle–income countries that 
bake–in profits as opposed to providing the vaccines at cost.261 Fur-
ther, COVAX has been criticized for not divulging the specific 
terms of agreements executed with vaccine manufacturers, along 
with not reconciling intellectual property issues related to the 
newly–developed vaccines.262 Certain nations in the European Un-
ion claimed that APAs are more efficient and cost–effective than the 
COVAX method, and opted out of utilizing the COVAX facility to 
purchase vaccine doses.263 Nevertheless, in the summer of 2020, the 
European Union pledged 400 million dollars to COVAX to collab-
orate in the future and secure vaccines for lower and middle–income 
countries.264 
Despite attempts to withdraw from the WHO in July 2020, the 
U.S. recently reaffirmed its commitment to remaining in the organ-
ization.265 As part of the announcement to continue as a member of 
the WHO, President Biden’s chief medical adviser, Anthony Fauci, 
also confirmed that the U.S. will join the COVAX initiative to 
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facilitate the delivery of vaccine doses to lower–income coun-
tries.266 In echoing the support of a coordinated, global response to 
the pandemic, Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Julian Braithwaite, 
“welcome[d] the decision by the U.S. to join the COVAX facility, 
because vaccinating our own populations is not enough scientifi-
cally or morally.”267  
 Canada, which has secured a stockpile of potential vaccine 
doses through its multiple APAs, recently committed 75 million Ca-
nadian dollars in funding for the delivery of COVID–19 vaccines to 
lower–income nations.268 Moreover, Canada announced an addi-
tional investment of five million Canadian dollars towards the equi-
table reallocation of COVID–19 vaccines that are processed through 
the COVAX facility.269  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In order to effectively counter the impact of a worldwide pan-
demic, countries should continue their global response.270 The 
COVID–19 Law Lab, which collects and makes available legal doc-
uments and frameworks from over 190 countries worldwide, is a 
promising start.271 The objective of this initiative is to provide ac-
cess to any country seeking to improve its existing legal framework 
in order to keep the pandemic under control.272 As part of this col-
laboration, countries can mimic aspects from other countries’ public 
health strategies and implement effective laws to “help build strong 
health systems; evaluate and approve safe and effective drugs and 
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vaccines; advance human rights; and enforce actions to create 
healthier and safer public spaces and workplaces.”273 
Another component to a coordinated pandemic response is 
providing equitable vaccine access to participating nations through 
a global vaccine network.274 Although bilateral agreements are ben-
eficial for the participating nations, they do not properly address the 
overarching goal of achieving herd immunity.275 But regardless of 
whether the nation realizes herd immunity on a domestic level, it 
may still be vulnerable to negative health impacts caused by other 
countries’ lack of equitable vaccine access.276 So if countries com-
mit to participating in a concerted effort to obtain vaccines for as 
many countries as possible, it will likely shorten the time frame of 
the pandemic, and reduce economic and health costs.277  
 COVAX, launched by Gavi, helps create equitable access to 
COVID–19 vaccines.278 This initiative provides a “lifeline” to lower 
and middle–income countries that lack the financial resources to en-
ter into APAs with manufacturers279 by affording all participating 
countries the opportunity to obtain effective vaccine doses at re-
duced costs.280 Thus, we can see that the benefits of the global vac-
cine network that has been created over the past two years are two-
fold: nations may directly protect their citizens through an increased 
likelihood of securing vaccine doses while indirectly countering the 
effects of the pandemic on a global level, as increased vaccine ac-
cess will gradually lead to herd immunity.281 
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